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Gibson v'. Union Rolling Mill Co.,
3 Watts., 32.
Thus it comes back to the vague
expression, the intention of the
parties as inferred from their acts,
their situation, and all the circum-
stances of the case. From some
circumstances it may be inferred
that the parties meant to take the
risk of the thing which has turned
out contrary to their expecta-
tions, as in the case of the coal mine
which had coal but not coal work-
able at a profit: Walker v. Tucker,
supra. The total absence of coal or
iron ore would not be a risk
contemplated in such a lease, how-
ever, Muhlenberg v. Henning, Fritz-
ler v. Robinson, sufp-a, and would
be ground for rescission. Perhaps
it is safe to say that where the
fact or thing in question is such
that it only affects the value of the
bargain gotten by the contract, but
does not strike at, or totally destroy-
the main consideration, it will not
afford ground for rescission.
For, while it must not be sup-
posed that in buying or selling
the parties intend to make any
special value in the thing bought
or sold an essential of their con-
tract, yet it is reasonable to sup-
pose that they did contemplate, as.
essential, the existence of the thing
itself substantially, that is, in sell-
ing a patent they meant a vali&
patent, in selling a right to mine
coal they meant a right to coal,
not to a mere hole in the ground,
although they must be supposed
to take the risk of its being work-
able at a profit. In a contract for
personal service, they must have
contemplated the risk of death or
of inability to perform.
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Fellow Servants.
The foreman of an extra gang of track repairers who had the entire
charge, including the sole supervision of the work and the employment
of servants, is a vice-principal for whose negligence the railroad company
is liable to a workman injured while under his orders. Though under
the law of Wisconsin, where the accident happened, the company would
not be liable, since no State statute is to be construed, the Federal author-
ities will be followed and the workman may recover from the company,
Ross v. C. M. & S. P. R. R., 112 U. S., 377, followed.
1 51 Fed. Rep., 182. June 20, 1892.
MASTER'S LIABILITY TO A SERVANT.
T= MASTER'S LIABILITY TO . SERVANT FOR THE TORTS OF
ANOTiER SERVANT.
This case furnishes an excellent
example of the different views en-
tertained by the various Courts in
the United States upon the subject
-of the master's liability to the ser-
vant for injuries caused by the neg-
ligence of another servant of the
-same master engaged in the same
employment. Had the action been
'brought in the State Court of Wis-
consin, the servant could not have
Tecovered, the master only being
liable to one servant for another's
acts while that other is engaged in
performing some duty which the
master himself owes to the servant,
irrespective of the relative ranks of
the servants. On theotherhand, in
the Federal Courts the right to re-
-cover depends upon the question
whether the servant causing the
injury has been given authority and
control over the one injured.
The rule that a master is exempt
from liability to a servant for in-
juries sustained by him through the
default of a fellow servant is by no
means ancient. The first trace of
it is found in the case of Priestly v.
Fowler, 3 M. & W., i, decided in
the Exchequer in 1837, yet in the
fifty years that have passed since
then the rule has been applied in
almost innumerable cases. The
principle has never been ques-
tioned, but it is as to the extent of
its application that such widely
diflerent views have been enter-
tained.
The two earliest cases, Priestly
v. Fowler and Murray v. South
Carolina R. R., I McMulIan (S.C.),
375, went partly upon the ground
that the master is under no obliga-
tion, either under the contract of
employment or in consequence of
the relation in which he stands to
the servant, to answer, in the ab-
sence of knowledge of any defect
or incompetency, for the absolute
safety of the appliances supplied
or the skill and carefulness of his
other servants, and partly upon the
ground, so clearly stated by C. J.
SHAW and Mr. Baron ALDERSON in
the two cases next decided, that
the consequence of a fellow serv-
ant's negligence was one of the
risks assumed by the servant when
entering into the master's service.
In the first case Lord ABINGER held
that the servant could not hold the
master responsible for an injury
received by him owing to the
breaking down of one of the mas-
ter's vans on which he was riding,
the breakdown being caused by
overloading; and in the second a
railroad company was held not
liable to one of its firemen for an
injury caused by the carelessness
of an engineer.
It was said that the danger was
quite as well within the servant's
observation as the master's, and
the servant was not bound to risk
his life in the master's imploy-
ment, but might decline any service
in which he had reason to appre-
hend injury to himself. In Farwell
v. Boston & Worcester R.-R., 4
Metc., 49, Chief Justice SHAW, of
Massachusetts, laid down the basis
of the doctrine as follows: The
servant does not stand to the mas-
ter in the position of a stranger,
therefore the maxim respondeat
sufperior does not apply between
them. Their rights and liability
are governed by the contract of
service. In the contract there
was neither expressed nor implied
any obligation upon themaster's
part to answer for the skill and
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care of all the other .servants.
"On the contrary," he says, "he
who enters into the employment
of another for the performance
.of certain duties and services,
takes upon himself the natural and
ordinary risks and perils incident
.to the performance of such ser-
vices, and in legal presumption .the
compensation is adjusted accord-
ingly.. Nor should the perils aris-
ingfrom the carelessness of those
in same employment be excepted.
They are perils which the servant
is as likely to know as the master;
they are as incident to the service
and as distinctly provided for in
the rate of compensation as any
other risk. Nor was the near aso:
ciation of the servants the test.
The rights of the parties did not
depend upon the servant's ability
to observe and avoid the negli-
gence of the fellow servant, but
upon the absence of any duty on
the master's part, arising from the
contract or otherwise, to answer for
the skill and care of his other em-
ployees." In Hutchinson v. York,
Newcastle & Berwick P. R., 5
Exch., 343 (1850), Air. Baron Ai-
DBRSoN arrived at precisely the
same conclusion, where a servant
of the railroad, in the discharge of
his duty, was riding upon a train
belonging to the railway and was
killed by an accident occurring
through the negligence of the
engineer of another train, also
belonging to the defendant com-
pany. The plea of the defendant
company set out that the servants
in charge of the second train were
competent and fit persons to have
control of a train, and that the acci-
dent was entirely due to their neg-
ligence, without any negligence on
the part of the company. The plea
was held good. The servant "knew
when he engaged in the service
that he was exposed to the risk of
injury, not only from his own want
of skill or care, but also from the
want of it on the part of his fellow-
servants, and he must be supposed
to have contracted on the terms that
*as between himself and his mas-
ter he would run this risk." Itwas,
objected that the master was not
exempt from liability unless the
injury resulted from acts of ser-
vants engaged in a common act of
service at the time.' This objection
was not sustained, and the principle
was stated to be "that a servant
when he engages to serve a master,
undertakes, as between himself and
his master, to run all the ordinary
risks of the -service, and this in-
cludes the risk of negligence on,
the part of a fellow servant when-
ever he is acting in discharge of his.
duty as servant of him who is the
common master of both." But
"the master shall take due care not
to expose his servant to unreason-
able risks." Where, too, the ser-
,vant is nof at the time of injury
acting in the service ofhis master,
he is substantially a stranger, and
the master is not exempt from'
responsibility to him for the negli-
gence of another servant causing
.that injury. And this reasoning
has been accepted as the true basis
of the rule in practically every
court in which this question has
arisen. The sole difference of
opinion has been as to the extent of'
the risks assumed by the servant of
the duty of the masterto use reason-
able care to protect the servant
from risks not necessarily incident
to the employment.
It has been urged that while this.
reasoning assumes that the servant
has knowingly and willingly ac-
cepted the risks and to have been
FOR THE TORTS OF
paid therefor in the calculation of
wages, in reality the pressure of.
poverty and necessity makes it
farcical to consider that he has
voluntarily .done so, no option
being left to him but to take the
place or starve, and that wages are
never governed by the risks of the
business, but by the law of supply
and demand; even grantingthis to
be true, although there is much
reason to hold the statement to be
far too broad, the hard position of
the servant, while it may aroupe
sympathy for him, cannot alter the
fact that he has with his eyes open
to risks of the employment and,
voluntarily, as between the master
and himself, no matter how great
the compulsion of outside circum-
stances, entered into a contract of
service at. a rate of wages which is
agreed upon as between them as a
sufficient compensation for the ser-
vices rendered and the risks as-
sumed. The workman may not be
in a position to demandwhat would
in reality compensate him for the
risks he runs, but no more may he
be able to contract for all that his
labor is really worth; could he
then set aside the contract he had
made and recover as near as may
be the true value of his services,
because the law of supply and
demand and inability to secure any
other employment had forced him
to agree to accept wages which did
not adequately represent the value
of his labor?
The servant then assumes all the
ordinary risks necessarily incident
to his employment-all such as one
entering into any employment does
or should, by the exercise of reason-
able care, foresee that he will be ex-
posed to in the ordinary course of
such employment. Heshould fore-
see that he will be Associated with
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other personsemployed by the same
master to effect the same general
end, and that his safety will depend
upon the care and skill with which
those so associated with him per-
form their duties. If the business
is a large one, divided into numer-
ous departments, he should foresee
that while he may be far separated
physically from those employed in
another departmient, their careless-
ness may notthe less affect him, and
cause peril to him which he may
not be able to avoid. He should
foresee that he must of necessity
be under the control and authority
of other servants of the same mas-
ter, and to the careful and skillful
manner in which they exercise
their authority must he look for
safety.
The master's exemption from
liability only exists while both
servants are engaged in his service.
When the servant has ceased work
for the day, and is no longer en-
gaged in the master's service, he
stands to the master in the relation
of a stranger, and for an injury oc-
curring to him through the default"
of any other servant the master is
responsible as to any stranger. So
where a carter had carelessly left
upon the sidewalk of his master's
factory a pile of ashes, a servant of
the same master, who, having left
the factory on his way home from
work, fell over the ash heap and
was injured, was held entitled to
recover against his master, the
relation of fellow servant ceasing
with the end of the day's work.
Baird v. Pettit, 70 Pa., 477.
I. The servant does not by enter-
ing into the master's service ab-
solve him from all liability for any
injury suffered by him while in his
employ. He only assumes those
risks which are naturally and
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ordinarily, it might be said neces-
sarily, incident to the employment
in which he engages-not which, in
addition thereto, are created by'the
master's own careless or willful dis-
regard of the servant's safety. He
agrees -to run only those risks of
necessity involved in the employ-
ment conducted with due care and
regard for the servant's safety. The
master may not expose the servant
by his own carelessness to risks
not inherent in the very nature of'
the service, and then claim exemp-
tion from liability for any injury
resulting therefrom on the ground
that the risk was one accepted by
the servant himself.
The law imposes upon the mas-
ter, in consequence of the relation
in which he stands to the servant,
the duty to use all reasonable care
that the employment shall be as
little dangerous to his servants as
its nature will allow. Certain
duties are conceded by all Courts,
however they may vary as to the
extent bf the master's liability, to
be owing by the master to the
servant.
The master must use reasonable
care and skill (I) to provide the ser-
vant sufficient and safe machinery
and appliances with which to work,
(2) to provide a safe and proper
place wherein to work, (3) to em-
ploy and retain in his employment
servants coiipetent and skillful to
the best of his knowledge, sufficient
in number to carry on the business
with safety, (4) to establish a rea-
sonably safe system of rules and
regulations for the conduct of the
business, (5) to see that no one ser-
vant is placed in a hazardous em-
ployment, the risks of which he
does not know and is not bound to
know, without due warning-of its
dangerous character.
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These are duties imposed upon
the master himself, duties absolute
and imperative, from which he can
free himself by nothing short of
performance. His duty is not to
provide a reasonably safe system
for the selection of fit machinery,
for instance, such a system as, if
followed, will procure proper ap-
pliances; his duty is to see him-
self that none but safe and proper
machinery is provided, and in de-
fault of this to be responsible for
the consequences; not to entrust
the selection of servants to a sub-
ordinate, but to see that no man
who by reasonable care would be
discovered to be incompetent or
careless is employed, and if he fail
to do so it is no excuse to plead
that the subordinate to whom the
selection of servants was given was
the most skillful and scrupulously
exact person in existence, and had
never been in fault before. See.
however, Merry v. Wilson, 1 H. L.
Sc. Ap. Cases, 326. It is a duty
personal to the master, who cannot
delegate it to another, or, if he
does, and that other fail, he must
still be liable, not because the
other was known to him to be un-
fit, but because he has not fulfillgd
his legal obligations. Some diffi-
culty has arisen owing to the fre-
quency of the cases in which the
master is a corlioration, incapable
of acting save through agents.
It is asked, shall a corporation,.
therefore, never be liable to a ser-
vant for injuries sustained in its
employ? The answer is simple:
Its duties as master are neither
greater nor less than those of an
individual. It owes the same duties
to its servants, and since it can only
act through agents, it must be an-
swerable for any default by the
agent in the doing of that which it
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-is th master's duty to do, just as
any natural person is responsible
for the default of his subordinate
in the performance of the duty
which he himself is under to his ser-
vants. In the one case the corpora-
tion has no choice but to act through
an agent, in the other the master
could act for himself, but chooses
to act through a subordinate; in
both the master is liable to the ser-
vant for any default.
In England and many States of
the United States this has come to
be the test: Was the servant who
caused the injury engaged in doing
that which itwas the master's duty
to do, or something which was
solely a servant's duty? In the first
case the master is liable, in the
second he is not.
It has by some been thought that
even where the master's liability is
most restricted, if he entrusts the
management of the entire business,
or a distinct part thereof to another,
he is liable for all his acts. This
will be found to be based on cases
deciding that where a master, be
he a natural being or corporation,
entrusts to a servant full control
over the performance of any of
these duties, he is liable to any
other servant injured by their
non-performance. This is not
adding on to these duties any
further one; it is merely a state-
ment applicable to particular facts
of the general rule that a master
may not free himself from his lia-
bilities for the performance of his
personal duties by delegating the
performance of them to another:
'Mullan v. S. S. Co., 78 Pa., 25, pro-
viding fit machinery and tools;
Brinkner v. Lane, 2 Lansing (N.
Y.), 506; App., 49 N.Y., 672, choos-
ing servants.
The.test, then, is whether the set-
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vaut, whose negligence caused the
injury, was at the time engaged in
performing a duty which the law
imposed upon the master (those
duties being included under the
five heads above given), or was
merely doing that which it is the
duty of a servant to do. The test
is briefly the character of the act
done, and not the relative position
of the parties causing and sustain-
ing the injury. "It is immaterial
whether he who causes the and he
who sustains the injury are or are
not engaged in the same or similar
labor, or in positions of equal or
greater authority. If they are act-
ing together under one master in
carrying out a common object they
are fellow-servants," GRAY, J. Gil-
man v. Eastern R. R., io Allen
(Mass.), 233. As siid by PoI,-
Loc , C. B., in Morgan v. Vale
of Health R. R., Ex. Ch. L. R.,
1 Q. B., 149, "we must not over
refine, but look at the common
object, not the common immediate
object." All persons engaged un-
der the same master in the further-
ance of the same business, no mat-
ter how different the immediate
object of their work may be, how
dissimilar the details of their em-
ployment, are fellow-servaiits. So
a carpenter at work on the roof of
an engine shed was held in the
latter case to be a fellow-servant of
parties moving an engine on a
turn-table below.
In New York this test has been
strictly adhered to. The question
always considered is whether the
negligence was in the performance
of any of the above enumerated
duties, which the master owes to
the servant.
In Crispin v. Babbitt, 8I N. Y.,
518, it was held that even where the
sole control of the entire business
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was given to a superintendent, the
master was not liable to the servant
for the doing by the superintendent
of something which it was not the
master's duty but the servant's to
do. In this case the superintendent,
in assisting to ran the machinery
in the factory, injured a servant,
and the master was held not re-
sponsible. So it is submitted that
if the master himself had so en-
gaged in the business he would not
be liable as master to the servant
for his own negligence, but as the
very person by whose default the
accident occurred, just as of course
one servant could recover against
another whose negligence had in-.
jured him, nor could one member
of a firm make the firm liable as
master for his carelessness in doing
of such an act. In Pennsylvania
the same test is laid down in in-
numerable cases, prominent among
which are Lewis v. Seifert, 116 Pa.,
628, an W . Ross, 139 Pa.
This tys", ether the servant
whose default caused the accident
was' engaged in performing one of
these duties (see above), which the
master is bound to see performed,
is adopted in the following States:
Massachusetts, Holden v. R. R.,
I29 Mass., 268; New York, Crispin
v. Babbitt, 8i N. Y., 518; Pennsyl-
vania, Lewis v. Seifert, i6 Pa.,
628; Michigan, Quincy Mining Co.
- v.Kitts, 42 Mich., 34, decidingthat
the master cannot delegate selec-
tibn of servants to a subordinate,
and so escape liability; Missouri,
Brothers v. Carter, 52 Mo., 373,
but departed from later; Texas,
Robinson v. Houston & Texas
Central R. Co., 46 Tex., 550;
Indiana, Kreuger v. R. R., iii
Ind., 5i; Vermont, Davis v. V. C.
R. RK Co., 55 Vt., 84; Virginia, with
later tendency to follow Ross' case.
See West Virginia, Criswell v.
Pittsb. R. R., 33 Am. and Eng. R.
R. Co.; Wisconsin, Brabbitts v. C.
& N. W. R. R., 38 Wis., 289.
So in Maryland, Alabama, Rhode
Island and Kansas, probably the
only cases where the master is held
liable to one servant for another's
default is where one of the above
duties is delegated to the servant
who is negligent.
In South Carolina the test is said
to be the same as in New York, but
the courts extend the master's
duties so as to include the superin-
tendence of every portion of the
business.
II. There have been two distinct
departures from this view of a
master's exemption from liability,
both tending to limit and restrict
to much narrower boundaries his
exemption. The first and by far
the most important widely adopted
limitation being that where a ser-.
vant is placed in a position of au-
thority and control over his fellow
servants, who are bound to obey
his orders, that servant so far rep-
resents the master as to render him
responsible for any default in the.
exercise of his authority by reason
of which any of those servants un-
der him are injured.- This doctrine
originated in Ohio, in 1851, in
R. R. v. Stevens, ,20 Ohio, 216, and
was based upon a Scotch case,
Dixon v. Rankin, 14 Ct. Sessions,
Sc. Cases, 420, overruled in the
House of Lords in Coal Co. v. Reid,
3 Macq., 266.' It spread through-
out the West and South, and has
found acceptance in a court of so
high authority as the Supreme
Court of the United States, but
never gained any foothold in the
courts of New England or of the
Middle States.
It goes upon the reasoning that
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-while, so long as two servants of the
same master occupy positions of
equal grade and neither is under
the control of the other, neither is
entitled to treat the other as agent
or representative of the common
master, yet where one is under the
authority of the other, and bound
to obey his orders, he is entitled to
regard that other as representing
the master.
When this theory was advanced
in the earliest American cases it
was immediately rejected, both in
Massachusetts, by Chief Justice
SHA.W, and in Murray v. R. R.
in South Carolina. Nor did it ever
find any favor in England. In
Murray 74 R. R. it was held that the
engineer no inore represented the
railway than did the fireman:
"The movement of a train to its
destination is the result of the
ordinary performance by each of
their several duties. On the part
of the several agents it is a joint
undertaking where each stipulates
* for the performance of his several
part; they are not liable to the
company for the conduct of each
other, nor is the company liable to
one for the misconduct of the
other."
By this view the servant is held
to take upon himself the risk of
negligence on the part of only
those fellow servants who are equal
or inferior in grade to himself.
Surely, as Mr. Justice MOORE says
in Robinson v. R. R., 46 Texas,
55o: "The negligence of one grade
is as much one of the risks of the
business as the negligence of one
of another grade, and it seems im-
possible to hold that the servant
contracts to run the risk of the
negligent acts and omissions of
one class of servants and not of
those of another class." He must,
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or should, foresee that he will be
associated with servants some in
authority over him, some not, from
whose negligence he may appre-
hend danger. If this be not an
ordinary risk which the servant
must be assumed to have foreseen
and accepted, it must be because it
is the master's duty to his servant
not only to provide careful and
skillful persons to take charge of
every branch of the work, but even
to personally superintend every
portion of the work done, to per-
sonally exercise every particle of
authority in the business, to him-
self issue every order and stand re-
sponsible for every consequence of
the careful and skillful carrying
out of such orders. All that the
servant risks is that the orders may
be carelessly or unskillfully carried
out.
And this is the view which the
courts of South Carolina, departing
from the earlier cases, has held in
Couch v. C. C. &A. R. R., 22S. C.,
557. While the master is only
liable to the servant for the default
of a fellow servant while perform-
ing a duty belonging to the master
personally, the proper exercise of
the authority entrusted to a section
boss of the members of his squad is
such a duty. So that the master
becomes responsible for the proper
exercise of any authority, however
slight, conferred upon any suborai-
nate, however low in grade; he is
responsible for the issuing of every
order by any servant who has power
to give orders; he is in fact re-
quired personally to manage and
supervise every detail of his busi-
ness, however vast it may ,be and
however trivial that detail; he
must personally issue every order
and be answerable for the result of
a careful obedience to it, and if he
MASTER'S LIABILITY TO A SERVANT
delegate this duty he cannot dis-
charge himself from liability. The
duty is absolute and personal; for a
failure in its performance he is
answerable, no matter how com-
petent and exact is the servant to
whom he entrusts it. It requires
the master to be omnipresent and
all but omnipotent, surely a some-
what burdensome obligation to
impose upon a master who is at
best only a human being, often a
corporation, which is not even that,
and never an almighty deity.
It is only where the superior ser-
vant is exercising an authority
conferred on him that the master
is liable for his default; he is not
the master's representative while
engaged in working with the sub-
ordinates in the performance of his
own commands. It is the improper
exercise of an authority which the
master is held bound to see prop-
erly exercised that makes him
liable, notthe superior grade of the
servant alone. In many casesusu-
ally cited as establishing the mas-
ter's liability for the acts of a ser-
vant placed in control of others, it
will be found that the servant has
been entrusted with the perform-
ance of some one of those duties
already stated to be conceded to
belong exclusively to the master:
R. R. v. Little,. i9 Kan., 267.
Where the master was held liable
to servant injured by defect in der-
rick, for negligence of fellow ser-
vant to whom he had entrusted en-
tire authority over his machinery
and its inspection: Same facts in
R. R. v. State, 44 Md., 283; same
facts in Wilson v. Co., 50 Conn.,
433; Mining Co. v. Kitts (Mich).
Where master entrusted to servant
the duty of employing servants:
Walter v. Boling, 22 Ala., 294;
1R. R. v. Rerejoy, 86 Kan., 424.
Where servant was ordered by his
superior into position of unusual
danger without due warning, also
Mann v. Print. Works, ii R. I., 152,
where same state of facts existed.
The Ohio rule is accepted in Ken-
tucky (L. & N. R. R. v. 1Collins,
2 Duv, 114). Laborer assisting en-
gineer to right a locomotive in-
jured by engineer's negligence);
Illinois (1R. R. v. May, 108 Ill., 288.
Foreman and laborer under him);
Tennessee (Fast Tenn. R. R. v.
'Collins, 85 Tenn. 227; Section boss
and section hand); Missouri (Nooce
'. Wabach, 85 Mo., 588, but seeBro-
ther v. Carter, 52 Mo., 373); Ne-
braska (R.. R.. v. Landstrum. Con-
ductor of construction train and
laborer); South (Couch v. C. C. &
A. R. R., 22 S. C., 557- Section
master and hand, but see Gunter
v. Graniteville Co., 18 S. C., 262);
andNorth Carolina (Patton v. R. R.,
96 N. C., 455. Section master and
laborer); Virginia, and most import-
ant of all, the Supreme Court of
the United States (C., St. P. & N.
R. R v. Ross, 112 U. S., 377); and-
to a limited extent in Iowa (Brann
v. R. R., 53 Iowa, 663; Baldwin v..
R.. R., 63 Iowa, 21o;.in 186o in
Wisconsin, but overruled the next
year (Mosely v. Chamberlain, iS
Wis., 700, see also Howland v. R.
R., 54 Wis., 226; Brabbits v. R. R.,
Wis., 289),
In the C., M. & St. Paul R_ R. v.
Ross, 112 U. S., 377, the Supreme
Court of the United States, follow-
ing the Ohio rule,. decided that
where a conductor by negligent
failure to communicate his running
orders to the engineer had caused
a collision in which the engineer
was injured, the railroad company
was liable, Mr. Justice FxVLD say-
ing: "There is, in our judgment,
a clear distinction to be made in
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their relation to the common mas-
ter between servants of a corpora-
tion exercising no supervision over
others engaged in the same employ-
ment and those agents of the cor-
poration clothed with the control
and management of a distinct de-
partment in which their duty is en-
tirely that of direction and superin-
tendence. A conductor having
entire control of a railway train
occupies a very different position
from a brakeman, the porters -and
other subordinate employees. He
is, in fact, and is to be regarded as,
the general representative of the
corporation, for whose negligence
it is responsible to subordinate ser-
vants." The Court considered that
all the authority of the corporation
necessary for the running of the
train was confided to the conductor,
and he, for that purpose, repre-
sented the compan,. The great
flaw in this reasoning is that the
conductor has not exclusive control
over the running of his train, trains
being usually run under orders from
higher sources. He is like the en-
gineer, only engaged in the execu-
tion of those orders. THAYasz, J.,
in the principal case, R. R. v. Peter-
sen, thus interprets R. R. v. Ross:
"The test applicable to the deter-
mination of the question of fellow
service is not whether the servant
has charge of an important depart-
ment of the master's service, bfit
whether his duties are exclusively
those of supervision, direction and
control over a work undertaken by
the master, and over employees en-
gaged in such work whose duty it
is to obey, and whether he has been
vested by the master with such
power of supervision and manage-
ment."
r1I. In certain States of the United
States a still further limitation of
ANOTHER SERVANT. 349
the master's exemption from liabil-
ity has been adopted. However, it
has never reached the popularity
enjoyed by the "superior servant
limitation." It is only accepted in
Illinois, Georgia, Kentucky, Ten-
nessee, Virginia, West Virginia and
Arizona. Indiana, which at first
adopted it, soon repudiated it, and
it has been expressly rejected by
the court, which has given to the
superior servant theory such im-
portance, the Supreme Court of the
United States in Quebec S. S. v.
Merchant, 133 U. S., 375. The
limitation is that the master is only
exempt from liability where both
servants are so closely associated
that the one injured might be able'
to observe and protect himself from
the other's negligence better than
the master could. The explanation
given by Mr. Justice DIcKEY, in R.
R. v. Miranda, 93 Ill., 302, is this:
The master's liability to a stranger
depends on public policy-the mas-
ter is thus impelled to greater care
in selection of his servant, and the
servant is rendered more careful by
his devotion to his master's in-
terest (?) Where, however, the
reason ceases, the liability ceases.
A servant working in close associa-
tion with another, has power of
rendering fellow-servants careful-
by precept and example, and as a
last painful resource to report their
shortcoming to the master that he
may discharge the careless servant
-- greater than the master can have,
therefore the master should not be
liable when injury results from
carelessness or incompetence of
such servant; but where there is no,
such association existing, the ser-
vant is in no better position than a
stranger. He, too, must trust to the
master's care in selecting his ser-
vants and the servant's regard for
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the master's interests, and to him
as to a stranger the master should
be liable for the servant's short-
comings. In Farwell's case, C.'J.
SHAw expressly repudiates any
-such basis for a master's exemption.
He says that the reason is not be-
cause the servant is better able to
take care of himself than the mas-
ter is to care for him, but because
there is no obligation on the mas-
ter's part either under the contract
or in tort as to a stranger, to be
responsible for the default of a
fellow servani. "Hence the separa-
tion of the employment into differ-
ent departments cannot create that
liability when it does not arise
from an express or implied contract
or from a responsibility created by
law to third persons and strangers
for the negligence of a servant."
This limitation has been expressly
repudiated in the U. S. Supreme
Court: Merchant v. Quebec S.
S. Co., 133 U. S., 375. Where a
stewardess belonging to steward's
department was injured by pegli-
gence of fellow servants belonging
to deck department, it was held
the master was not liable. The
other servants had no control over
her, and the division of depart-
ments .was for convenience in ad-
ministration of the vessel, -and did
not make the other servants any
the less fellow servants with stew-
ardess. It is expresslyrejected also
in New York: Wright v. R. R., 25
N, Y., 562. Pennsylvania: Bud &
Co. v. Newberry, 96 Pa., 246; R. R.
v. Bell, 112 Pa., 400. Massachu-
setts: Holden v. R. R., 129, 268.
Rhode Island: Brodeur v. Co., 17
Atl. Rep., 55. Texas: R. R. v.
Harrington, 54 Tex., 59; North
Carolina: 9 4N. C., 62-. Michigan:
Quincy Mining Co. v. Kitts, 42
Mich., 34; Elevator Co. v. Neal.
Maryland: 65 Md., 438. Minnesota:
Foster v. R. R. 114 Minn., 360.
Indiana: Gormley v. R. R., 72
Ind., 31.
. It is accepted, as before said, in
Illinois: Miranda v. R. R., 93 Ill.;
302, and io8 Ill., 376. Section
hand injured by fireman of passing
train carelessly throwing out lump
of coal. Kentucky: R. R. v. Collin,
2 Dnv., II4. A laborer loading cars
injured by negligence of engineer:
Georgia: Cooper v. Milleirs, 30 Ga.,
i5o. Engineer of one train injured
by negligence of a servant of same
railway in charge of another train.
Tennessee: R. R. v. Jones, 9 Heisk.,
27. Fireman killed by explosion
of boiler owing to boiler makers'
carelessness.
Virginia: Moon v. R. R., 78 Va.,
745. West Virginia: Madden v.
R. R., 28 W. Va., 6Io. But even in
these States workmen, though unu-
der different foremen, if engaged
in same line of employment and
brought frequently into contact,
are so far felldw servants that the
master is not liable to one for in-
juries caused by another's default:
O'Bryan v. R. R., 15 Ill. App., 134.
IV. In those States where the
master's liability is made to de-
pend not upon the -relative rank of
the servants, but upon the nature
of the duty which the negligent
servant is engaged in performing,
the question which is of decisive
importance in these cases is the
nature and extent of duty owed by
the master to his servants.
These duties, as has been seen,
fall naturally under five heads:
(i) The Duty to Provide Safe
Afachinery.-The master must sup-
ply machinery containing no defect
which reasonable skill and care
might prevent. The master, how-
ever, is only responsible when the
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iachinery is supplied to the ser-
vant for use in his employment.
So when railway engines are first
-inspected by boiler makers, then
by machinists and then by me-
chanics who regulate the safety
-valves, and owing to negligent
inspection by the boiler makers the
boiler bursts while a mechanic is
fitting a valve and injures him, the
master is not liable: Murphy v.
R. R., 88 N. Y., 146.
The business of constructing and
inspecting engines was a branch of
-the railway business as well as the
running of trains. Theengine was
not part of the machinery furnished
-the mechanic to work with, but the
very thing upon whicli his work
was to be performed. The boiler
maker and mechanic were fellow
servants engaged in the common
-employment of inspection: Mur-
phy v. R. R., 88 N. Y., 146. Had
the engine gone into the service of
-the railway company and while
drawing a railway train burst and
-injured the engineer, whose duty it
was to use the engine as an appli-
.ance of his employment, the com-
pany would have been liable.
Nor is a railway company which
receives cars for transportation
from another railway bound to test
-their safety, but may assume them
to be safe in absence of proof to
-the contrary: Mackin v. R. R., 135
Mass., 201; Bullon v. R. R., 54
Wis., 269. In Wisconsin a dis-
-tinction is drawn between machi-
nery sent out from the master's
shops complete and ready for use
and machinery sent out in parts to
be put together and erected at the
scene of the work. In the latter
case the master is not liable for the
manner in which it is put togethef,
if he has employed competent and
-sufficient servants to do the work
and supplied them with proper
materials: -Peschell v. R. R., 62
Wis., 338. It is hard to perceive
the force of this distinction, nor is
it generally accepted.
In England, the rule is that the
master is only required to furnish
originally safe and suitable machin-
ery and competent servants and ap-
pliancesfor keepingthem in repair,
but not personally to answer for
their being always kept in good con-
dition: Wilson v. Merry, L. R., 1,
H. L. Sc. Ap. Ca., 326. This is
followed in Massachusetts: Johnson
v. Towboat Co., 135 Mass., 209;
Maryland: Wonder v. R. R., 32
Md., 4II; and New Jersey - Mc-
Andrews v. Burns, 39 N.J. L., 17.
In the other States a master is
bound not only to furnish proper
appliances but to keep them in
good repair.
(2) Duty to Provide a Safe Place
for the Servants to Work in.-The
master is under same obligation in
regard to place of work as the tools
and appliances for work. Where
the workman must work upon a
scaffolding the master is, as a rule,
liable for accidents resulting from
its improper construction by his
servants, as well as those resulting
from the use of improper materials.
The most usual example is the duty
imposed on a railway of providing
and maintaining proper roadbed so
that its servants may be in no peril
therefrom: Snow v. R. R., 8 Allen
kMass.), 441. But in Mississippi
the company is only bound to pro-
vide a proper roadbed and a com-
petent and well equipped staff to
repair it: Howd v. R. R., 5o Miss.,
178. So in NewJersey: Harrison v.
R. R., 31 N. J. L., 293, and Alabama:
R. R. v. Smith, 59 Ala., 245.
But if the servant, knowing of a
defect in machinery or place of
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work, remains, he accepts the risks
thereof as an extra risk in addition
to the ordinary risks of the em-
ployment, and cannot hold his
master responsible if injured in
consequence of such defect: An-
thony v. Luret, IO5 N. Y., 59,
Rummel v. Dilworth, Iii Pa., 343.
In England, however, in Smith v.
Baker, L. R., A. C., i89i, Lord
HBRSHELI. says: " Where a risk to
the employed," not a necessary in-
cident of the business, "which may
or may not result in injury, has
been created or enhanced by the
negligence of the employee, the
mere continuance in servie with
knowledge of the risk will not pre-
clude the employed, if injured by
such negligence, from recovering
in respect to his employer's breach
of duty."
(3) The Duty to Employ Profer
Servants.-The master on engag-
ing a servant should make reason-
-able investigation of his skill, char-
acter and habits. He is responsible
for any injuries causei by a failure
to do so: Frazier v. R. R., 38 Pa.,
io4. If a servant has been engaged,
but is unfit, the master is bound not
to retain him in his employment
after information of his incompe-
tence is conveyed to him. He is
not bound to take notice of every
act of incompetence unless in some
way brought to his notice, and un-
less a superior servant has the
power to einploy and discharge the
incompetent servant notice to him
is not notice to the master: Reiser
v. P. R. R., 152 Pa., 38 Adv. Rep.
The master must furnish a suffi-
cient number of servants for the
-safe performance of every piece of
work. Where a brakeman was
injured in an accident caused by
a train dispatcher sending out a
train with an insufficient number
of hands, it was held it was negli-
gence in performance of a duty
properly belonging to the company,
for the consequence of which it was.
liable: Flike v. R. R., 53 N. Y.,
549.
(4) The Duty to make such Gen-
eral Rules as will Render the Em-
piloyment Safe.-The master is not
liable for results of disobedience or
improper fulfilment of such orders-
Where a subordinate is given the
power to make such rules, and issues-
an unreasonable special order from
the obedience of -which damage re-
s'ults, the master is liable. A rail-
road company is bound to make and
publish safe and sufficient rules-
for the running of its trains; the
making of such schedule or time
table is the duty of the company,
which it cannot delegate so as to-
escape responsibility: Besel I. R.
R., 7o N. Y., 171 ; Vose v. R. R.
Co., 2 H. & N. (Eng.), 720.' Where
a variation is made in the time of
running a train it is the duty of the
company, to bring this variation,
which is in effect a new schedule,
to the notice of its servants: Lewis-
v. Seifert, I6 Pa., 628. The com-
pany is not bound to personally see-
that notices of the variation in the-
time table is brought home to the
servants. The master discharges-
his duty when beforehand he pro-
vides and makes khown to a servant
rules explicit and efficient whereby
notice will reach him if observed..
He is not answerable for careless-
ness in the observance of the rules-
Rose v. R. R., 88 N. Y., 27; Ford
v. R. R., ioMass., 24o. Ifacom--
petent system for the transmission
be provided, and notice is put in
such orderly course of communica-
tion by him who has control of the-
making and publishing of rules, it-
is sufficient.
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(5) The Duty to Warn Inexperi-
.enced Servants of Unusual and
Non-apparent Dangers Incident to
the Particular Service.-" If own-
*ers of dangerous machinery employ
young persons about it quite in-
experienced in its use, either with.
*out proper directions as to its use, or
with improper directions and likely
to lead to danger of which the young
persons are unaware, as it is their
duty to take unusual care to avert
-such danger, they are liable for any
injuries which may ensue from the
use of such machinery. The dan-
ger was apparent to one having
experience, but not to one not hav-
ing experience" (Lord CocKBuRN):
Grizzle v. Frost, 3 F. & F., 622. So
if an adult have no experience and
the master so knows, but a minor
having experience takes the risk.
Test is-Were the circumstances
such that the master should know
that the servant neither knew, nor
-could with ordinary care become
aware of the danger.?
The servant only takes on him-
self those risks which with reason-
able care he might know to be in-
cident to his employment. The
master is bound to disclose to the
servant any non-apparent risks of
the service. A servant was em-
ployed to run a circular saw, and
had never seen one. It was held
that if there was danger known to
the master and not known to the
servant, and which he could not
have become aware by exercise of
reasonable care, there was an abso-
lute duty upon the master to give
notice of it from which he could not
escape by delegating it to a careful
subordinate: Wheeler v. Wason
Mfg. Co., 135 Mass., 294; Keller v.
Swenk, 151 Pa., 505.
V. In England and many of the
States the subject is regulated by
statute. In England, by the Em-
ploye4s' Liability Act of i88o, the
master is liable to servant for in-
juries resulting from ( I) any de-
fect in condition of machinery,
ways or works or plant; (Q 2) any
negligence in the exercise of power
of superintendence delegated to a
servant; (Q 3) the negligence of
any servant, whose orders servant
injured was bound to obey; (0 4)
obedience to rules laid down by
master's authority; ( 5) by negli-
gence of any railway servant in
charge of signal points, engines or
trains. In Massachusetts the Act
of 1881 follows the English Act
closely, but with some important
difference, among others the omis-
sion of .3 and 4.
In Minnesota the law of 1887,
Chap. 13, provides that railway in
public use shall be liable to em-
ploy6 for co-employ 's default.
In Mississippi the Rev. Code, 188o,
i054, alters but does not abrogate
the common law. Rhode Island,
by Rev. St., 1879, 318, has placed
railway employ( in position of
passenger, and requires the com-
pany to exercise toward him the
same extreme care it owes passen-
ger. Wisconsin passed in 1875 an
act making railways liable to ser-
vants for fellow servants' negli-
gence, but in 188o repealed it, and
returned to the common law. In
Iowa, by Statute of 1887, provided
that railway company shall be liable
to employ6 for any wilful wrong
of commission or omission on part
of any agent or servant when such
wrong occurred in connection with
operation of such railway. Kansas
in 1874 passed a more general act
applicable to railways, but con-
strued to extend only like Iowa act
to those engaged in the. hazardous
business of railroad. By Georgia
